



**Monthly Update and Reminders  
May 2019**



**IN THIS ISSUE:**

**HOT ITEMS**

**1. New Password**

**THE REST OF THE STORY**

**2. Recurring reminders**

**3. Pass Travel news**

**4. Airline News**

**5. LAC News**

**6. New Members**

**7. The Lighter Side**

**8. Gone West**

**HOT ITEMS:**

The new password for accessing the Member Rosters, the Golden Contrails Magazine and the Archived Blast Emails is **throttle**.

## THE REST OF THE STORY

### RECURRING REMINDERS:

Annual dues are due on Dec 31st and are considered delinquent on Jan 1st. If not paid by April 30th, members will be considered not in good standing and will be removed from all Golden Eagles communications. Dues status can be checked on our website, [www.thegoldeneagles.org](http://www.thegoldeneagles.org), in the Membership section and the Roster Download sub-section. *The current password is not required to go to the "store" on the website and pay dues, so if you inadvertently forgot to pay your dues before the cutoff date of April 30th and suddenly find that you are no longer receiving GE communications, you can still access the website without the password and bring your dues up to date.*

The date in the lower right corner of your contact information is the year through which you have paid your dues. Complete details on how to pay your dues is contained on the website also in the Membership section under the Pay Dues and Postage sub-section.

We occasionally receive a request from non-Golden Eagles members to be "added to our email list" without any awareness that it is a "benefit" of membership. To that end, while we are happy to have members share these emails with their friends, we would hope that this "sharing" would include encouragement to join.

### PASS TRAVEL NEWS

#### Recurring question and answer:

If there are PS's above you listed in business, are they already in the count or will they be assigned a seat from what is showing as available? So with this listing should we only be counting on 5 available seats in business?

Departs	Arrives	Flight #	Travel Time	Upg	Capacity	F/C/Y	PS	F/C/Y	SA	F/C/Y	Avail	F/C/Y
SFO 1:15p	PPT 6:50p	UA0115	8 hr 35 mn	1	0/36/183	0/2/0	0/4/4	0/7/7				

Pass Class	Board Date	# of Seats	Cabin	Pass Ride
Your calculated board date of 1/4/1996 is based on your and days of service on your actual travel date. See Empl Links for calculation details.				
PS5B	31DEC1985	1	Business	CHO, E.
PS5B	31DEC1985	1	Business	LAN, T.
SA0V	01JAN1996	2	Business	WIL, J.

Positive Space seats have already been removed from the available seats count. There are 7 available seats in "C" and 7 in "Y".

## AIRLINE NEWS

### Boeing Did Not Fix MAX AOA Warning Issue Found in 2017

May 5, 2019 [Sean Broderick](#) | Aviation Daily

[Boeing](#) discovered in 2017 that its 737 MAXs were being delivered without an error warning light activating as intended, but determined the issue was not a safety risk and did not need immediate correction, the company said May 5.

The revelation adds more context to why the flight-deck angle of attack (AOA) Disagree warning lights, meant to tell pilots of a discrepancy between the aircraft's two AOA sensors, have only been active on MAX aircraft equipped with a package of options. It also raises more questions about the 737 MAX's development and oversight by both Boeing and the [FAA](#), in the wake of two fatal crashes.

"The Boeing design requirements for the 737 MAX included the AOA disagree alert as a standard, standalone feature, in keeping with Boeing's fundamental design philosophy of retaining commonality with the [737NG](#)," Boeing said. "In 2017, within several months after beginning 737 MAX deliveries, engineers at Boeing identified that the 737 MAX display system software did not correctly meet the AOA disagree alert requirements. The software delivered to Boeing linked the AOA disagree alert to the AOA indicator, which is an optional feature on the MAX and the NG. Accordingly, the software activated the AOA disagree alert only if an airline opted for the AOA indicator."

Boeing's statement does not discuss whether the software was developed to its specifications, or whether the vendor —Collins Aerospace—introduced the incorrect configuration. Collins referred all questions to Boeing.

Boeing said it followed its "standard process for determining the appropriate resolution of such issues," including a review with "multiple company subject-matter experts." The review "determined that the absence of the AOA disagree alert did not adversely impact airplane safety or operation," Boeing said. "Accordingly, the review concluded, the existing functionality was acceptable until the alert and the indicator could be delinked in the next planned display system software update."

Boeing's senior management was not involved in the review, and neither Boeing's senior leadership nor FAA were made aware of the issue until after the October 29, 2018, crash of Lion Air Flight 610.

The AOA sensors provide key data to the MAX's maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) flight control law that is the focus of two fatal 737-8 accidents—Lion Air flight 610 and the March 10 crash of [Ethiopian Airlines](#) flight 302—in which all 346 people were killed and that have left the MAX fleet grounded.

In each accident, faulty data sent by one AOA sensor told the aircraft's flight control computer that its

nose was too high, causing MCAS to move the horizontal stabilizer and push the nose down. Preliminary reports on each accident suggest the pilots were not able to diagnose the failure quickly enough, and MCAS—programmed to keep directing the nose down if the AOA data shows the angle of attack is too high—continued to activate. Both aircraft dove to impact.

Neither Lion Air nor Ethiopian Airlines had the optional AOA disagree warning package. The accident sequences would have triggered an AOA disagree alert, adding it to several that activated, including a stick-shaker stall warning.

Following the Lion Air accident, Boeing convened a "safety review board" (SRB) to revisit whether the AOA Disagree issue was a safety risk. "That SRB confirmed Boeing's prior conclusion that it did not," Boeing said. "Boeing shared this conclusion and the supporting SRB analysis with the FAA."

Addressing reporters following a Boeing shareholder meeting on April 29, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg downplayed the significance of the AOA disagree warning's role in delivering key information to pilots. "It's not something that drives pilot action," he said. "It's not something that we designed in as a primary flight display in the flight deck of a commercial airplane. What pilots care about are things like altitude, airspeed, heading, pitch and roll. That's what they fly. Those indicators are in the flight deck today. Airspeed and altitude in particular are the relevant items around these two [accidents]."

But even if the absence of the warning lights is not linked to either accident, the issue adds more questions to the MAX's development, and how much airlines knew about changes from the 737NG. MCAS was not on the NG, and most pilots didn't know it existed until after the Lion Air accident.

Boeing is updating MCAS, adding another AOA sensor data feed to prevent the system from acting on one piece of faulty data. The changes also will limit MCAS's authority, in part by removing its ability to push the nose down repeatedly based on faulty AOA data. In addition, Boeing will make both the AOA disagree and AOA indicator standard on all MAXs, offering free modifications for aircraft already delivered.

## **FAA Seeks More Input On Proposed MAX Training**

May 7, 2019 [Sean Broderick](#) | Aviation Daily



Boeing

WASHINGTON—[FAA](#) has posted the draft of revised [Boeing 737](#) minimum training standards that incorporate the MAX's maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) for a third public comment period.

The new comment deadline is May 15.

The draft Flight Standardization Board (FSB) report does not recommend simulator training for the MCAS or its failure modes, sticking to recommendations made by a board that reviewed [Boeing's](#) proposed updates to the system in March. MAX training "must include" the MCAS in a list of "special emphasis areas" covered in ground training, the report said. "MCAS ground training must address system description, functionality, associated failure conditions, and flight crew alerting. These items must be included in initial, upgrade, transition, differences, and recurrent training," it adds. It would be Level B, or computer-based, training.

The FSB report, which covers all versions of the 737 since the family is on a single type certificate, is in its 17th revision. Finalizing the standards is one of the final key steps to getting the 737's operations bans removed by regulators. The most recent FSB comment deadline was at the end of April—a date that was extended when some pilot groups said they were not given adequate notice to comment on the proposals.

It was not immediately clear why FAA put the draft out for additional review. "The FAA may further amend revision 17," FAA said in a note on its website. "If so, it will be posted for another comment period."

Boeing is modifying the MCAS [software](#) and training based on preliminary findings in two 737 MAX 8 accidents in five months in which pilots did not manage an MCAS-related failure mode.

While the FAA-approved training may not include simulator time, at least some other regulators are expected to mandate it on top of the minimum standards.

## [ALPA: Simulator Time Not Needed To Un-Ground 737 MAX](#)

WASHINGTON—The world's largest pilots' union will not ask [FAA](#) to require additional mandatory simulator training on maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) scenarios for 737 MAX pilots before they can fly, but will recommend it as part of routine recurrent training, Aviation Week has

learned.

The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) will make its views known in comments on a draft of proposed minimum 737 training standards out for public comment. The Flight Standardization Board (FSB) draft report does not recommend simulator sessions as part of transition training for [737 Next Generation](#) pilots upgrading to the MAX, opting for less costly computer-based training instead.

A person with knowledge of ALPA's comments tells Aviation Week that the pilots' union will go a step further, calling for hands-on simulator training at the earliest scheduled opportunity. Under this scenario, MAX pilots would fly simulated MCAS-related scenarios within a year or so as MAX simulators become available, but not before they return to line operations once flight restrictions on the model are lifted. Some regulators are expected to require simulator training as conditions for removing their operations bans, and [Air Canada](#) has said it is already using its MAX simulator—the only one in airline hands in North America—to run its 420 MAX pilots through MCAS-related scenarios.

ALPA's training recommendations will include other additions to the draft document as well—most of them emphasizing MCAS-related differences between the NG and the MAX. The MCAS was needed for certification purposes to enhance pitch stability with slats and flaps retracted at very light weights and full aft center-of gravity (CG), ensuring the MAX handled like the NG. The system activates when the aircraft's speed approaches threshold AOA, or stick-shaker stall-warning activation, for the aircraft's configuration and flight profile.

The union wants the AOA Disagree alert message and its relation to MCAS added to items given "special emphasis" in MAX training. The MCAS is fed by angle of attack (AOA) data, and activates when the data shows the aircraft's nose as being too high for the current flight profile. ALPA wants pilots to understand the link between AOA Disagree alerts, which will now be standard on primary flight displays for all MAXs, and the MCAS's role of automatically moving the horizontal stabilizer to compensate for an AOA approaching aerodynamic stall.

The union also wants MAX pilots to understand that nose-down stabilizer trim applied by MCAS cannot be countered by pulling back on the yokes. The MCAS is an extension of the 737 speed trim system (STS), which automatically moves the stabilizer to ensure pitch is maintained as speed increases. On the NG, stick force inputs override runaway trim, including the STS runaways. On the MAX, stick force overrides all runaway trim conditions, but not MCAS.

[Boeing](#) determined that allowing the MCAS to be countered by pulling back on the yoke could negate its purpose, so the column brake is bypassed when the MCAS is activated. Instead, the MCAS can be countered using yoke-mounted electric trim switches or, in extreme conditions, by toggling cutout switches that de-power the trim motors and using hand-cranked trim wheels.

The public has until May 15 to comment on the draft FSB report. Approving it will be a key step in getting the MAX fleet back in the air, along with having regulators sign off on changes to the MCAS [software](#) that Boeing is finalizing.

FAA said it will consider the public's input before making a final decision on the FSB's contents. "We are looking forward to reviewing all of the comments," the agency said.

The Air Line Pilots Association did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Regulators grounded the 370-aircraft operational fleet in mid-March following the second of two fatal MAX 8

accidents. The MCAS's erroneous activation played a role in each accident. Boeing is modifying the system's logic by adding triple redundant angle of attack validity checks to add data redundancy and reduce its authority to activate multiple times in certain scenarios and by limiting its stabilizer command authority to a single, proportionate nose down trim input.

Boeing designed the MCAS to operate in the background and only if the aircraft were being operating in a small corner of the flight envelope. Both the company and the original FSB that worked on the model's 2017 certification determined that special training on the system's operation was not necessary. As a result, the system was not covered in flight [manuals](#). The updates will add information on the system's operation.

Boeing and the 2017 FSB team also determined that pilots would recognize an MCAS-related failure as stabilizer runaway—a common air transport issue that pilots are trained to manage with a memorized checklist.

But in both MAX 8 accident sequences, the crew did not immediately diagnose the MCAS inputs, triggered by erroneous AOA data, as stabilizer runaway. They countered the MCAS with manual electric trim inputs, which re-set the MCAS and caused it to activate again based on the continued [stream](#) of faulty AOA data. Had the crews not used the electric trim, the MCAS system would not have activated repeatedly, eventually leading to uncontrollable dives. Boeing's software update removes this function so that electric trim does not re-set MCAS so that it cannot operate again based on faulty data.

ALPA, which represents pilots at MAX operators [United Airlines](#) and WestJet, also will advise that pilots practice as many MCAS-failure-related emergency scenarios as necessary to demonstrate competency. Boeing's explanation of MCAS following the first accident, Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018, listed nine related "indications and effects" that could result from an AOA Disagree alert and possible MCAS [activation](#).

While the FSB still must be finalized, mandatory simulator training before qualified 737NG pilots fly the MAX is not expected to be part of the package.

"At this point, we're not hearing that [simulator training] will be a requirement," [Southwest Airlines](#) CEO Gary Kelly said recently. "Just getting pilots back into the simulator for an event would be a challenge, and that would take time. But my own interpretation is that we already do the kind of training that one would be contemplating to put the MAX back into service. Managing the aircraft in a runaway stabilizer scenario is something that we already trained on and...has already been covered."

## Ethiopian MAX Crash Simulator Scenario Stuns Pilots

May 10, 2019 [Sean Broderick](#) | Aviation Daily



Wreckage from Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302.

Jemal Countess/Getty Images

WASHINGTON—A simulator session flown by a U.S.-based [Boeing 737](#)MAX crew that mimicked a key portion of the [Ethiopian Airlines](#) Flight 302 (ET302) accident sequence suggests that the Ethiopian crew faced a near-impossible task of getting their 737 MAX 8 back under control, and underscores the importance of pilots understanding severe runaway trim recovery [procedures](#).

Details of the session, shared with Aviation Week, were flown voluntarily as part of routine, recurrent training. Its purpose: practice recovering from a scenario in which the aircraft was out of trim and wanting to descend while flying at a high rate of speed. This is what the ET302 crew faced when it toggled cutout switches to de-power the MAX's automatic stabilizer trim motor, disabling the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) that was erroneously trimming the horizontal stabilizer nose-down.

In such a scenario, once the trim motor is de-powered, the pilots must use the hand-operated manual trim wheels to adjust the stabilizers. But they also must keep the aircraft from descending by pulling back on the control columns to deflect the elevator portions of the stabilizer upward. Aerodynamic forces from the nose-up elevator deflection make the entire stabilizer more difficult to move, and higher airspeed exacerbates the issue.

The U.S. crew tested this by setting up a 737-Next Generation simulator at 10,000 ft., 250 kt. and 2 deg. nose up stabilizer trim. This is slightly higher altitude but otherwise similar to what the ET302 crew faced as it de-powered the trim motors 3 min. into the 6 min. flight, and about 1 min. after the first uncommanded MCAS input. Leading up to the scenario, the Ethiopian crew used column-mounted manual electric trim to counter some of the MCAS inputs, but did not get the aircraft back to level trim, as the 737 manual instructs before de-powering the stabilizer trim motor. The crew also did not reduce their unusually high speed.

What the U.S. crew found was eye-opening. Keeping the aircraft level required significant aft-column pressure by the captain, and aerodynamic forces prevented the first officer from moving the trim wheel a full turn. They resorted to a little-known procedure to regain control.

The crew repeatedly executed a three-step [process](#) known as the roller coaster. First, let the aircraft's nose drop, removing elevator nose-down force. Second, crank the trim wheel, inputting nose-up

stabilizer, as the aircraft descends. Third, pull back on the yokes to raise the nose and slow the descent. The excessive descent rates during the first two steps meant the crew got as low as 2,000 ft. during the recovery.

The Ethiopian Ministry of Transport preliminary report on the Mar. 10 ET302 accident suggests the crew attempted to use manual trim after de-powering the stabilizer motors, but determined it “was not working,” the report said. A constant thrust setting at 94% N1 meant ET302’s airspeed increased to the 737 MAX’s maximum (V<sub>mo</sub>), 340 kt., soon after the stabilizer trim motors were cut off, and did not drop below that level for the remainder of the flight. The pilots, struggling to keep the aircraft from descending, also maintained steady to strong aft control-column inputs from the time MCAS first fired through the end of the flight.

The U.S. crew’s session and a video posted recently by YouTube’s Mentour Pilot that [shows](#) a similar scenario inside a simulator suggest that the resulting forces on ET302’s stabilizer would have made it nearly impossible to move by hand.

Neither the current 737 flight manual nor any MCAS-related guidance issued by [Boeing](#) in the wake of the October 2018 crash of Lion Air Flight 610 (JT610), when MCAS first came to light for most pilots, discuss the roller-coaster procedure for recovering from severe out-of-trim conditions. The 737 manual explains that “effort required to manually rotate the stabilizer trim wheels may be higher under certain flight conditions,” but does not provide details.

The pilot who shared the scenario said he learned the roller coaster procedure from excerpts of a 737-200 manual posted in an [online](#) pilot forum in the wake of the MAX accidents. It is not taught at his airline.

Boeing’s assumption was that erroneous stabilizer nose-down inputs by MCAS, such as those experienced by both the JT610 and ET302 crews, would be diagnosed as runaway stabilizer. The checklist to counter runaway stabilizer includes using the cutout switches to de-power the stabilizer trim motor. The ET302 crew followed this, but not until the aircraft was severely out of trim following the MCAS inputs triggered by faulty angle-of-attack (AOA) data that told the system the aircraft’s nose was too high.

Unable to move the stabilizer manually, the ET302 crew moved the cutout switches to power the stabilizer trim motors—something the runaway stabilizer checklist states should not be done. While this enabled their column-mounted electric trim input switches, it also re-activated MCAS, which again received the faulty AOA data and trimmed the stabilizer nose down, leading to a fatal dive.

The simulator session underscored the importance of reacting quickly to uncommanded stabilizer movements and avoiding a severe out-of-trim condition, one of the pilots involved said. “I don’t think the situation would be survivable at 350 kt. and below 5,000 ft,” this pilot noted.

The ET302 crew climbed through 5,000 ft. shortly after de-powering the trim motors, and got to about 8,000 ft.—the same amount of altitude the U.S. crew used up during the roller-coaster maneuvers—before the final dive. A second pilot not involved in the session but who reviewed the scenario’s details said it highlighted several training opportunities.

“This is the sort of simulator experience airline crews need to gain an understanding of how runaway trim can make the aircraft very difficult to control, and how important it is to rehearse use of manual trim inputs,” this pilot said.

While Boeing’s runaway stabilizer checklist does not specify it, the second pilot recommended a maximum

thrust of 75% N1 and a 4 deg. nose-up pitch to keep airspeed under control.

Boeing is developing modifications to MCAS, as well as additional training. Simulator sessions are expected to be integrated into recurrent training, and may be required by some regulators, and opted for by some airlines, before pilots are cleared to fly MAXs again. The MAX fleet has been grounded since mid-March, a direct result of the two accidents.

## United launches nonstop service from DIA to Frankfurt

United Airlines will fly daily, year-round flights from Denver to Frankfurt.

Author: Alexander Kirk

Published: 10:44 AM MDT May 7, 2019

DENVER — [United Airlines](#) has launched daily, nonstop service between Denver International Airport (DEN) and Frankfurt, Germany (FRA).

The flights will operate with a Boeing 787-8 aircraft year-round between the two hubs, [Denver International Airport](#) announced Thursday at a gate celebration.

The [Frankfurt](#) flight will use the same aircraft United uses to operate service from Denver to Tokyo-Narita (NRT) and London-Heathrow (LHR).

“United has added two trans-Atlantic flights from Denver in the last two years, including our newest addition to Frankfurt, which demonstrates our commitment to growing and [investing](#) in Denver,” said Steve Jaquith, United’s vice president of the Denver hub. “We’re proud to provide even more ways we can connect Denver to the world.”

Flights will depart Denver at 3:40 p.m. and arrive Frankfurt at 9:20 a.m. the next day. Return flights from Frankfurt will depart at 11:05 a.m. and arrive in Denver at 1:20 p.m., according to DEN.

“We welcome United’s continued expansion at Denver International Airport,” said Kim Day, Denver International Airport CEO. “These new flights to Frankfurt will not only provide a new option for Denver travelers to access the heart of Europe but will strengthen Denver’s position as a premier connecting hub in the global Star Alliance network.”

With the new Frankfurt flight, Denver International Airport will have 50 weekly nonstop flights to Europe in the summer of 2019.

## LAC NEWS

In addition to our annual reunion/convention that is held to allow our members to reconnect with old friends and to make new ones, we have the Local Area Council (LAC) program in cities wherein a number of Golden Eagles members and retired/former Continental pilots reside.

If you would be interested in attending regularly scheduled luncheon and/or breakfast gatherings, the

names and email addresses of the organizers of these functions is posted below. We hope you will consider joining one of the groups for some good camaraderie and casual dining.

**Houston area LAC`s- Conroe, The Woodlands and Kindgwood** - Bill Chambers,  
bbob7045@gmail.com and Bruce Sprague,Treasurer\_Webmaster@thegoldeneagles.org.

**Hill Country LAC - San Antonio and Austin area** - Dave Newell,  
EVP\_EmailCoordinator@thegoldeneagles.org

**Newark LAC** - Mark Sheprow, Membership@thegoldeneagles.org

**Denver LAC** - Russell McKnire - [rwcknire@comcast.net](mailto:rwcknire@comcast.net)

Additional contact information for the above volunteers and additional information regarding the LAC program can be found on the Golden Eagles website, [www.thegoldeneagles.org](http://www.thegoldeneagles.org), in the LAC section.

## **NEW MEMBERS**

**Hank Thompson**

**May 2019**

**Retirement date 2002**

....The Lighter Side.....



### **The Deaf Wife Problem**

**Bert feared his wife Peg wasn't hearing as well as she used to and he thought she might need a hearing aid.**

**Not quite sure how to approach her, he called the family Doctor to discuss the problem.**

**The Doctor told him there is a simple informal test the husband could perform to give the Doctor a better idea about her hearing loss.**

**'Here's what you do,' said the Doctor, 'stand about 40 feet away from her, and in a normal conversational speaking tone see if she hears you. If not, go to 30 feet, then 20 feet, and so on until you get a response.'**

**That evening, the wife is in the kitchen cooking dinner, and he was In the den. He says to himself, 'I'm about 40 feet away, let's see what happens.' Then in a normal tone he asks, 'Honey, what's for dinner?'**

**No response.**

**So the husband moves closer to the kitchen, about 30 feet from his wife and repeats, 'Peg, what's for dinner?'**

**Still no response.**

**Next he moves into the dining room where he is about 20 feet from his Wife and asks, 'Honey, what's for dinner?'**


**Again he gets no response.**

**So, he walks up to the kitchen door, about 10 feet away. 'Honey, what's for dinner?'**

**Again there is no response.**

**So he walks right up behind her. 'Peg, what's for dinner?'**

**'For God's sake, Bert, for the FIFTH time, CHICKEN!'**



## GONE WEST



### GONE WEST - 2019

\* Denotes Golden Eagles member

Harry Watson *	Jan 10, 2019
Almond Carroll	Jan 22, 2019
Thomas Steele	Jan 27, 2019
John Huber	Feb 27, 2019
Robert DeGrishe	Mar 5, 2019
Robert Hutten	April 6, 2019
Carl McGee	April 8, 2019
Charlie Walker *	April 14, 2019
Dan Brady	May 9, 2019



**That`s all folks. See you next month around the 15th with another update.**

Dave Newell  
EVP/Golden Eagles Email Liaison  
EVP\_EmailCoordinator@thegoldeneagles.org



---

*Copyright © 2019 GoldenEagles Retiree Association, All rights reserved.*

Want to change how you receive these emails?  
You can [update your preferences](#) or [unsubscribe from this list](#)

